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THE 1976 AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT
GOVERNING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
BETWEEN TEACHER ORGANIZATIONS AND
BOARDS OF EDUCATION IN CONNECTICUT:
AN APPRAISAL
by Peter Adomeit*
I.

BACKGROUND

In 1976, the Connecticut General Assembly amended the Teach
er Negotiation Actl in several significant ways. This article reviews
these amendments. 2
The first statute governing teacher bargaining in Connecticut,
enacted in 1965,3 (this statute and its pre-1976 amendments will be
referred to as the 1965 Act) borrowed several principles from the
National Labor Relations Act:4 The right of employees to bargain
collectively; and to designate representatives for purposes of bar
gaining;6 the principle of exclusive representation permitting one
employee organization to bargain on behalf of the entire bargaining
* B.A., Carleton College; J.D., University of Minnesota; Associate Professor of 1.<1w,
University of Connecticut School of Law.
1. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-153a to 153g (1975) (current version at Casso GE.~.
STAT. §§ 10-153a to 153g (1977». Although there were some revisions in 1967, 1969,
and 1973, see note 3 infra, the 1965 Act remained substantially unchanged until the
1976 Amendments. When the text speaks of the 1965 Act, it is referring to the 1965 Act
and its pre-1976 amendments, which have been codified in the 1975 Connecticut Gen
eral Statutes. All footnote references will be to the 1975 (.-odification and parenthetically
to the current version.
2. 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts 76-403 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-15301 to 153g
(1977» [hereinafter referred to as the 1976 Amendments).
3. 1965 Conn. Pub. Acts 298. This act's pre-1976 amendments were 1973 Conn. Pub.
Acts 73-391, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 811, and 1967 Conn. Pub. Acts 752. The General
Assembly recognized the right of teachers to join or not to join professional organiza
tions in 1961. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153a (1964) (current version at Coss. GE.~. STAT.
§ 10-153a (1977». In 1951, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that bargaining in the
absence of a statute was lawful. See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138
Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
4. National Labor Relations Act, § 7,29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
5. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 100153b(e) (1975) (current version at Coss. GES. STAT.
§ 10-153b(e) (1977».
6. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(c) (1975) (current version at Coss. GES. STAT.
§ 10-153b(c) (1977».
545
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unit; 7 the right to an election to determine which organization should
represent the employees, with certification of the victor;8 the obliga
tion of both labor and management to bargain in good faith;D and a
prohibition against interference with the rights afforded employees by
the Act. 10 The 1965 Act also guaranteed rival teacher organizations
"equal access" to teachers and to school facilities such as mail boxes
and bulletin boards. l l
There were four major differences between the 1965 Teacher
Negotiation Act and the National Labor Relations Act. First, and
perhaps foremost, teachers could not strike--at least not lawfully. 12
To assist the parties in reaching agreement in the absence of the right
to strike, the 1965 Act provided for mandatory mediation 13 and man
datory, but nonbinding, arbitration. 14
Second, the administration of the 1965 Act was not given over to
an administrative agency. While the United States Congress en
trusted the primary responsibility for enforcing the National Labor
Relations Act to the National Labor Relations Board, the Connecticut
General Assembly did not entrust the 1965 Teacher Act to the Con
necticut State Board of Labor Relations-a decision that was to have
important consequences. Because the Connecticut State Department
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(e) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153b(e) (1977».
8. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153b(d) (1977».
9. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 1O-153d (1977». The provisions concerning good faith bargaining are now located at
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1977).
10. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153d (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153d (1977». The provisions concerning interference with the rights afforded em·
ployees are now located at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1977).
11. This right was conditioned upon "the absence of any recognition or certification"
of any teacher organization. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1975) (current version at
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1977». However, § 10-153c provided unconditionally that
"[elach organization shall have, during the election process, equal access to school mail
boxes and facilities." CONN. GEN. STAT. § § 1O·153c (1975) (current version at CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 1O-153c (1977».
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O·153e (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153e (1977».
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153f (1977». The same section authorized the Secretary to the State Board of Edu·
cation to recommend a basis for settlement. This was a power the mediators and the
Secretary rarely exercised. (In Connecticut, the positions of Secretary to the State Board
of Education and Connecticut Commissioner of Education are traditionally held by the
same person.)
14. "The decision of the arbitrators shall be advisory and shall not be binding upon
the parties to the dispute." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1975) (current version at
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1977».
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of Education was given the duty of providing mediators and arbi
trators to the parties,15 it acts more like the Federal ~lediation and
Conciliation Service, or the American Arbitration Association, th.m a
labor board.
Third, the Department of Education had no power whatsoever to
enforce the guarantees and proscriptions of the 1965 Act. 1G If labor or
management committed an unfair labor practice, there was no labor
board to tum to. In fact, the 1965 Act did not contain an unfair labor
practice section as such. 17 It guaranteed that teachers could exercise
statutory rights without interference or coercion 18 and it required
good faith bargaining,19 but that was all. The other unfair labor prac
tices proscribed in section 8(a) and (b) of the National Labor Relations
Act20 were absent from the 1965 Teacher Act.
Fourth, the Connecticut Act simply left it to the parties to de
cide who would conduct their elections. 21 Virtually all elections were
conducted by a private organization, the American Arbitration Associ
ation, rather than by an administrative agency such as the NLRB or
the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations. Under the National
Labor Relations Act, the employer does not pay for the cost of the
election; nor do the municipalities under Connecticut's ~lunicipal
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1975) (current version llt Coss. GE..... STAT.
§ 10-153f (1977).
The American Arbitration Association (AAA), II prh'llte, nonprofit organization, pro
vides lists of labor arbitrators upon request to those with arbitration c1auselt in their
collective bargaining agreements. The Federnl Mediation llnd Conciliation Service pro
vides a similar service. See F. Eu:oURl & E. ELKOURl, How ARBlTRATIOS WORKS
24-25 (3rd ed. 1973).
16. The Secretary to the State Board of Education could force either party to mediate
a dispute, and the Secretary could recommend a basis for settlement, but the powers of
the office stopped there. The Secretary could not force a settlement or prevent" strike.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1975) (current version at Cm-m. GE..... STAT. § 100153f
(1977».
17. In 1975, the General Assembly, by 1975 Conn. Special Act 75-91. ,mtllorized tlte
State Board of Education to prepare and submit to tlte Joint Stllnding Committee on
Education of the General Assembly "guidelines" governing good faitll bargaining. scope
of negotiations, and unfair labor practices. The guidelines issued were of unknown legal
force, being neither statutes nor regulations. They appeared to some to be .Ill interim
political step toward placing an unfair labor practice section into the statute.
18. This first appeared in 1969 Conn. Pub. Act 811, § I (amending Coss. GE.....
STAT. § 10-153a (1968».
19. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1975) (current version at Coss. GES. STAT.
§ 10-153d (1977». The provisions concerning good faith bargaining are now locolted at
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1977».
20. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 158!1l), (b).
21. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1975) (current version at Coss. GE..... STAT.
§ 10-153b(d) (1977». The overwhelming choice was the AAA. The town of ~teriden
once used the town clerk's office, but that choice was a clear exception.
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Employee Relations Act. 22 But under the 1965 Teacher Act, the cost
of administering the elections, approximately one dollar per vote, was
paid by the local board of education. 23

II.

UNIT DETERMINATION AND ELECTIONS: THE

1965

ACT

Under the 1965 Act the bargaining unit consisted of those pro
fessionals working in positions "requiring a teaching or special ser
yices certificate."24 Administrators were entitled to a separate unit. 25
Excluded from the teachers' unit were the superintendent and the
assistant superintendents, board negotiators, those responsible for
personnel relations or budget preparation, and "temporary substitutes
and all noncertified employees. "26 Professionals such as social work
ers, psychologists, librarians, and reading consultants were all re
quired to hold a certificate and therefore were included in the
teacher unit. Teachers' aides, janitors, groundskeepers, and bus driv
ers were not required to hold certificates and were excluded from the
teachers' unit.
The 1965 Act left to the parties to decide who would conduct
their election. 27 The American Arbitration Association (AAA), a pri
vate agency that conducts bargaining unit elections, has presided over
virtually every teacher election in Connecticut since the 1965 Act.
The AAA maintains a position of strict neutrality, refusing to make
any decision bearing on the election that may affect the outcome. For
example, the AAA will not set the date of the election, or the time,
or the polling places, or even the position of the parties on the ballot.
Before accepting any election duty, the AAA requires the parties to
sign an agreement containing a provision for a moderator.2B If the
22. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-471 (1977).
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153b(d) (1977». The election costs consisted of the fees of the AAA and the elec
tion moderator.
24. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(a)(2) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153b(a)(2) (1977».
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(a)(I) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153b(a)(I) (1977».
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153b(b) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 1O-153b(b) (1977».
27. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
28. The AAA standard election agreement reads in part: "The undersigned parties
have agreed that the AAA shall be the impartial agency to administer a teacher rep
resentative election, in accordance with its election rules and the Connecticut General
Statutes." The 1970 AAA Election Rules, (on file at the office of the AAA, 37 Lewis St.,
Hartford, Conn.) read in part:
The AAA ... may at any time appoint an election arbitrator or arbitrators from
its national panel of arbitrators. . . . The election arbitrator shall interpret and

1977]

1976 AMENDMENTS TO THE TNA

549

parties cannot agree on the crucial details of the election, the deci
sion is made by the moderator and not by the AAA. In practice, the
moderator sits down with the parties to the election in an effort to
mediate their differences. If mediation fails, the moderator simply
decides when and where the election will occur.29 The moderator
may also be called upon to declare when electioneering shall cease; to
set the date of the runoff election, if any; and perhaps most impor
tant, to determine eligibility to vote. In a close election, eligibility
decisions are crucial and may well determine the outcome. 30 A mod
erator of elections makes the kinds of eligibility decisions which
would be made by the NLRB or the State Board of Labor Relations.
There are some clear benefits to this system, as well as some
problems. The benefits are obvious: the process is fast and inexpen
sive. The parties can raise objections as the ballots are being placed
on the table for counting. The moderator can hold a mini-hearing on
the spot, review the statutory definition of the bargaining unit, and
make a decision on the eligibility of the voter. Occasionally, the
moderator will know in advance of a difficult eligibility issue and re
quest written briefs. Because the decision of the moderator is final,
and because a particular eligibility decision usually will not affect the
outcome of the election, the parties do not try to delay bargaining by
appealing the decision.
Problems with the system are also obvious. First, not all modapply these rules insofar as they relate to his powers and duties.... The Elec
tion Arbitrator shall rule on all challenged ballots and on any other objection to
the election, and shall certify the results of the election in writing.
Submitting to the moderator for decision such questions as eligibility of voters is clearly
consistent with the legislative purpose. The 1965 Act required the parties to submit any
eligibility dispute to arbitration. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 100153c (1975) (current ver
sion at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153c (1977». But the Act was unwieldy-it called for
each party to appoint its arbitrator. The board of education could appoint one or two,
each teachers' organization could appoint one, and those four would pick the "impartial
member." It does not take five arbitrators to decide a question of who may '·ote. Wisely,
the AM never invoked this procedure. Instead, the AM solved the problem by requir
ing the parties to agree to a single election moderator with broad powers over the con
duct of the election.
29. The relative strength of the rival teacher organizations frequentl)· "aries among
schools, so the question of where the teachers vote is regarded by the organizations as
crucial. Mail ballots have never been favored in teacher elections in Connecticut.
30. Some elections have been extremely close. In the Dec. 3, 1975, New London
election neither organization won a majority of ballots cast, so a runoff was necessary,
under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153b(d) (1977». The ultimate winner trailed in the regular election. yet won the
runoff election by one vote, 147-146. This was the second time the New London elec
tion had gone to a runoff. Where the vote is so close, the eligibility of pemlanent substi
tutes to vote could determine the outcome.
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erators may agree on an eligibility question. Thus, the system may
not operate uniformly. Second, the moderator's decision may be
wrong, but the only appeal is, "wait until next year."31 Third, the
moderator's decision on eligibility to vote may have an impact months
later at the bargaining table.
For example, a question arose in one town 32 over whether de
partment heads could vote. In the past, department heads had been
part of the teachers' unit; they spent the majority of their time teach
ing. They performed administrative functions but they were not re
quired to hold an administrative certificate. Then the local board of
education changed its policy and required department heads to hold
administrative certificates. By so doing, did the board remove them
from the teachers' unit and place them in the administrators' unit?
The two units were not the same, nor were the benefits the same;
the question had practical importance to the individuals and the
school system. The issue was raised during an election. It waS re
solved by a moderator, based in part upon the apparent wishes of the
majority of department heads and upon the wording of the Act. He
ruled they were not eligible to vote in the teachers' election, and as a
result, the department heads moved to the administrators' unit. 33
The moderator created the precedent which the parties then used to
resolve a bargaining issue.
Another example of a moderator's decision on eligibility which
had an impact beyond the election itself involved the town of
Wethersfield. A question arose over whether certain substitute
teachers were eligible to vote. The Act excludes, but does not define,
"temporary substitutes."34 Is a teacher who is hired in January to
31. Under the AAA agreement, see note 28 supra, the moderator's decision is final
and binding. The moderator is, in effect, an arbitrator. Under both the 1965 Act and thl'
1976 Amendments, eligibility questions are to be resolved through arbitration. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 1O-153c (1977). The statute contemplates a panel of arbitrators; the AAA
agreement only requires one. In either case, the moderator-arbitrator is deciding a
statutory issue, namely, who is included as a part of the bargaining unit under CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(a}(2} (1977). Because none of the decisions on eligibility issues
are published, or even issued in writing, how the moderators are deciding eligibility
issues is known only by the teacher organizations and the AAA.
32. The discussion in the text is based on cases in which the author was II pllrticl
pant. The names of the towns are protected by the privacy of IIrbitration.
33. Whether this decision was proper is not material here. The point is, simply, thllt
election moderators are deciding eligibility issues which have an impllct fllr beyond the
election itself. After the 1976 Amendment to the 1965 Act, II teachers' organizlltlon
could have presented the same question to the State Lllbor BOllrd by chllrging the BOllfd
of Education with refusing to bargain. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153e(b}(5}, (e) (1977).
34. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(b} (1977).

1977]

1976 AMENDMENTS TO THE T,VA

551

replace another teacher on indefinite sick leave a "temporary substi
tute?" What about a teacher hired in September to replace a teacher
on pregnancy leave? Or a teacher who is hired to be on standby each
day, and works as a substitute virtually every school day for several
years? Should these kinds of issues be resolved by moderators? The
question is statutory in nature: what did the General Assembly intend
when it defined the teacher bargaining unit?35 Before the 1976
Amendments, the only other tribunal available to resolve such dis
putes was the courts, and neither labor nor management appeared
eager to challenge a moderator's decision. So far as is known, the
eligibility decisions of the moderators, while sometimes the subject of
grumbling by teacher organizations or boards of education, were not
appealed to the courts. Yet, moderators at virtually every election
were called upon to make difficult eligibility decisions.
Another election problem under the 1965 Act was purely me
chanical: the statute did not provide for much time to conduct both
the main election and any required runoff election. 36 The 1965 Act
created a short election season, corresponding to the start of
35. The teacher bargaining unit is defined at CONN. GE.~. STAT. ~ 10-153b{a)12)
(1977).
36. Once a petition requesting an election was filed, the election had to occur within
20 and 45 days. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1975) (current version at Co:.os. GEN.
STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1977». The Act, in the same section, pro\·ided for a runoff election,
but did not say when the runoff was to be held. Out of fear that a court might rule that
the runoff had to occur within 45 days following the filing of the petition, the mod
erators scheduled the elections during the 45-day period. This fear was not unfounded.
The election section of the 1965 Act had been construed with rigidity in Bristol Fed·n
of Teachers v. Sanders, No. 179975 (Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 1973). The 1965 Act pro\·ided
for an election, with certification of the organization recciving a majority of the votes
cast. The most reasonable interpretation of this provision would permit a runoff election
in the event that the votes for "neither" organization prevented either organization from
winning a clear majority. Nevertheless, Judge Parskey ruled that because the statute
mentioned one election, it only allowed one election; if neither side won, there could
be no runoff. As a result of this decision, the organization that won a plUrality of votes
in the election, and a majority in the runoff, was denied bargaining rights. And the
organization that trailed after the election and lost the runoff continued on as the bar
gaining representative. The court did not mention the underlying purpose of the Act.
namely, to provide an orderly procedure for teachers to choose their bargaining rep
resentative. The legislature overturned this decision (1973 Conn. Pub. Acts 73-3851, but
the case illustrates an unfortunate rigid view of statutory construction and a willingness
to impose an unfair, impractical, and irrational procedure upon the parties. It also places
the blame on the legislature: "[I]f the failure to provide for a run-off produces an
anomalous result then resort should be had to the legislature for remedial action, not to
the courts." Id. at 3. This is wrong. The courts ought not abdicate their responsibility to
interpret statutes in a manner that is consistent with the statute's purpose. Now that the
State Board of Labor Relations has jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice sections of
the 1976 Amendments, perhaps the Act will be more liberally construed.
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Connecticut's winters.37 Because the AAA conducted virtually all
elections, they frequently were forced by the tight statutory time
limits to schedule runoff elections on the same day as regular elec
tions elsewhere, overstraining their resources. In addition, the Con
necticut weather frequently forced last minute cancellations of elec
tions.
The 1965 Act did not contain a "contract bar"; and the State
Department of Education did not read one into the Act. This meant
that an incumbent union could sign a three-y'ear contract, and the
very next year face an election. Even though two years remained
before its expiration, the contract did not bar the election. A three
year contract did not guarantee three years of labor stability. This
rule, which differed from the National Labor Relations Board rule,3s
encouraged annual elections.
Moreover, under the state practice, if the challenging union won
in the middle of the contract term, as happened in several towns, the
victorious union and the board of education had to face the question
of what to do with the contract. As could be expected, when this
scenario occurred, the newly certified union asked to tear up the old
contract, and the board resisted. Because there was no administrative
agency to turn to, the issue was resolved by the Connecticut Superior
Court, which ruled that the old contract remained in effect until it
expired,39 a result which is contrary to the rule under the National
Labor Relations Act. 40

III.

CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS UNDER 1976 ACT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS

The 1976 Amendments did not change the definition of the bar
gaining unit, and it left the election mechanism virtually intact. The
opposing teachers' organizations decide who is to conduct the elec
37. The season to petition for elections opened on October 1 and closed on
November 30. The season to vote opened 20 days after the first petition and closed 45
days after the last petition. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1975) (current version
at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1977». Many elections had to be scheduled around
the holidays.
38. See General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123,51 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1962).
39. Waterford Fed'n of Teachers v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., No. 043553 (Super. Ct.
Nov. 12, 1974). At the time of the decision, the statute contained no contract bar. Con
sequently, teachers could change bargaining representatives immediately after the sign
ing of a new contract. The court ruled that the new bargaining agent inherits the old
collective bargaining contract.
40. See Ludlow Typograph Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 724, 36 L.R.R.M. 1364 (1955); Ameri
can Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250, 32 L.R.R.M. 1439 (1953).
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tion,41 which as a practical matter means that the elections will con
tinue to be conducted by the AAA. Moderators will continue to make
crucial decisions concerning elections, including eligibility. The elec
tion season was moved from winter to early spring,42 and the time
limits were eased to allow ten days for runoffs. 43 The cost of the
elections was shifted from the boards of education to the teacher
organizations. 44 And the boards are no longer party to election
ground rules or to the agreement with the AAA appointing the mod
erator, which may raise some unforeseen practical problems.
Previously, when representatives of the school administration at
tended the ground rule meetings, the moderator would obtain their
written consent to provide lists of eligible voters. Now, these rep
resentatives no longer attend the meetings; nor are they parties to
the agreement appointing the moderator. Previously, whatever power
the moderators had over the boards originated from the board's
agreement with the AAA. While no board has flatly refused to fur
nish eligibility lists, disputes have arisen over the timing and cost of
compiling such lists. If persuasion fails to resolve such disputes, the
moderator can no longer order a resolution. And should a board of
education ever fail to produce the eligibility list, the moderator is
powerless to act.
The moderator's powers are limited in other ways. Consider the
problem of campaign electioneering. Frequently, the ground rules
which the parties either agree to, or which the parties are forced to
adhere to by decision of the moderator, provide for an end to elec
tioneering on the day before the voting. If one organization accuses
the other of passing out election material or stuffing teachers' mail
boxes on the day of election, there is little the moderator can do. Or,
if one organization accuses the other of passing out false or misleading
material, in theory, perhaps, the moderator can declare an election
void, but that has never been done, and the moderator's power to do
so has not been tested. 45
41. Local boards of education no longer contract with the agency conducting the
election. Section 10-153b(d), after the 1976 Amendments now omits the words "town or
regional board" from the same section of the 1965 Act. As a result. the town or regional
board is no longer a party to the agreement appointing the election agency. CoNN. GEo....
STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1977).
42. The petitioning season opens up March I and dose~ on April 30. The election
season remains from 20 to 45 days thereafter. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1977).
43. ld.
44. ld.
45. The Act requires the election to be held on or before the forty-fifth d.l), following
the petition. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1977). If the election were held on the
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If either teacher organization accuses the administration of favor
ing the rival organization by giving it advantages not given to the
other, the moderator is again powerless to act effectively. School
buildings are within the control of the administration, not the mod
erator. If a principal decides to bar organizers from the outside
union, while allowing representatives of the incumbent union to
enter the schools to discuss grievances, the moderator cannot re
spond. The administration is beyond the moderator's jurisdiction be
cause the administration no longer signs the agreement with the AAA
requiring the use of the moderator to resolve election disputes.
The moderators in Connecticut thus perform the same function
as the National Labor Relations Board in conducting elections, except
that the National Labor Relations Board has the power effectively to
police election abuse. The moderators lack that power.
Now that the State Board of Labor Relations has jurisdiction over
unfair labor practices in education,46 the Labor Board's decisions and
the decisions of the moderators as to which teachers are a part of the
bargaining unit may conflict. Assume one organization questions the
eligibility of teacher X, a substitute, to vote. A moderator's decision
that teacher X may vote leaves the question of whether the board of
education must bargain over the salary of teacher X unresolved. Just
because the moderator allowed teacher X to vote is no guarantee that
the board of education will acquiesce and permit the union to bargain
on behalf of that teacher. Thus, if the board of education resists, a
second hearing before the State Board of Labor Relations over
whether the teacher may be part of the unit is required.
In a recent election in Wethersfield, the moderator ruled that a
long-term substitute who was asked to be on call every school day,
and who taught as a substitute virtually every school day, and who
had been doing so for several years, was eligible to vote. This deci
sion did not bind the board of education because it was not a party to
the AAA agreement appointing the moderator, and because the mod
erator had no power to determine the unit for purposes of bargaining.
At the time of the election the question of whether this substitute
was part of the bargaining unit was pending before the State Board of
Labor Relations on a refusal to bargain charge. Following the elec
tion, the Labor Board's decision came down in favor of the teacher.47
last day, and if the moderator were to void the election because of a ground rule viola
tion, when could the next election be held?
46. See note 122 infra and accompanying text.
47. Wethersfield Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1560 (July 26,
1977).
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The board of education had to bargain over her salary.
In the Wethersfield case the State Labor Board and the mod
erator agreed. But what if they had reached conflicting results? What
if the moderator had ruled her eligible, the election had been won by
one vote, and thereafter the State Labor Board had ruled that she
was not part of the bargaining unit? Or, what if a moderator were to
rule that five substitutes were eligible to vote because their employ
ment, while perhaps lasting only a few months, was of indefinite du
ration, and the election is won by four votes? Assume that the Labor
Board later determines that the board of education need not bargain
over these employees because they are not within the bargaining
unit. What then? Is the election void?
Clearly the decisions ought to be the same in both cases, but
under the present system they may very well be different. The po
tential for disagreement between the moderator and the Labor Board
is always present. Some of these issues are close questions, ,md to
have the moderators deciding them during elections, and the Labor
Board afterwards, duplicates effort and may lead to inconsistent re
sults.
For the above reasons, the Act should be amended to place the
duty of conducting elections before the State Board of Labor Rela
tions, where questions of eligibility, access to schools, and alleged
false and misleading campaign materials may be resolved in a manner
that is consistent from school system to school system. The State
Labor Board already conducts elections among other public em
ployees,48 including other employees of boards of education;49 add
ing teacher elections would simply conform to the pattern.
The 1976 Amendments added a contract bar rule 50 which oper
ates to prevent elections during the first two years of any multiple
year contract. If a contract is for three years, an election may take
place during the third year, 51 but even if the rival organization wins,
the statute provides that the old contract terms remain in effect. 52
48. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-471 (1977).
49. See note 151 infra.
50. "Whenever a multiple year contract is in effect. no representative election ~h.1I1
be held until two years of such contract have elapsed or until less than one year n....
mains prior to the expiration date of such contract, whichever is ~ooner." Coss. CE.....
STAT. § 10-153b(e) (1977).
51. Id.
52. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(e) (1977) pro\'ides in part: "The tenll~ of ,til)' exist
ing contract shall not be abrogated by the election or deSignation of a new representa
tive." The rule in the private sector is the opposite. See note 40 SIIIJrU and ,ICCOmpan)'
ing text.
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The only drawback of the rule is the possibility, although a remote
one, that the incumbent may sign a contract with a duration of five
years or more and thereby bind the teachers to an agreement which
if signed in the private sector could be challenged after the third
year. 53
IV.

IMPASSE RESOLUTION: THE

1965

ACT

Under the 1965 Act contracts between boards of education and
teacher organizations were subject to town nullification, either by the
town council or (depending upon local law) the town meeting, or
even by referendum. 54 And while the fiscal authority had the final
word over the contract, that authority was not involved in the actual
bargaining. All too frequently, after months and months of bargain
ing, the parties would finally reach an agreement, only to see it
thrown out by the town council55 or voters. 56 While the power to
53. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
54. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153d (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153d (1977» providing in part:
The terms of such contract shall be binding on the legislative body of the town
or regional school district, unless such body rejects such contract at a regular or
special meeting called for such purpose within thirty days of the filing of the
contract. Any regional board of education shall call a district meeting to con
sider such contract within such thirty-day period if the chief executive officer of
any member town so requests in writing within fifteen days of the receipt of
the signed copy of the contract by the town clerk in such town. . . . If the
legislative body rejects such contract within such period, the parties shall re
negotiate the term~ of the contract in accordance with the procedure in this
section.
55. The New York Times reported the events leading up to the 1976 Meriden
teacher strike as follows:
As this city's 580 striking teachers marched on picket lines for the sixth day
today, some said they felt they were pawns in a complex game of power politics
that did not concern them.
The teachers went on strike April 7 after the city's Court of Common Council
twice rejected a two-year contract, approved by the Board of Education, that
called for a wage increase of 2.4 percent.
The Meriden Federation of Teachers later agreed to a settlement of a total of
$25 less for the two years, which was accepted by the Common Council, the
legislative body in this industrial city south of Hartford.
But late Saturday night, in a special session that ended only 10 minutes bl~
fore midnight, when the settlement would have become irrevocable by law, the
Common Council rejected the plan again.
Mayor Grossman declined to talk about the strike.
Other city officials said the underlying dispute in the strike was a disagree
ment between the Common Council and the Board of Education over the
amount and disposition of surplus school funds.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1976, at 37, col. 3.
56. For example, in 1976, the contract between the Cromwell Education Associntloll
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nullify was used with some responsibility in many towns, others saw
repeated taxpayer rejections of even modest contracts. For example,
in Regional District #16, the teachers tried four times to reach an
agreement with the town, finally succeeding after three arbitration
sessions and months of negotiations. 57
Bargaining under the 1965 Act was conducted against no real
deadline. Negotiations frequently began in November and lasted until
the following October or later. This meant that the municipal budget
had to be set before the contract was settled. Once the budget was
firm, it became politically difficult for boards to settle for anything
more than what was in the budget. Strikes were illegal,58 but a part
of the landscape.
If negotiations failed, the 1965 Act required the parties to
negotiate with the aid of a state-appointed mediator. 59 If the mediator
was unable to assist the parties in coming to an agreement, the Act
called for mandatory arbitration-but the arbitration award was not
binding. The parties could-and frequently did-reject the award.
Once these impasse procedures had run their course, and failed, and
the teachers went on strike, the statute did not give the State Board
of Education clear authority to intervene through mediation. 6o In
fact, if arbitration failed, the statute did not appear to require any
further proceedings whatsoever.61 In practice, however, most boards
of education and teacher organizations consented to a second round of
mediation, followed by a second round of nonbinding arbitration.
Mediators under the 1965 Act were appointed by the Secretary
to the State Board of Education. While the parties had no direct
control over who mediated their dispute, if the parties preferred a
particular mediator their wishes were usually granted. None of the
mediators served full time, none received formal training,62 and their

and the Cromwell Board of Education was rejected by referendum. The Hartford Cour
ant, Feb. 7, 1976, at 6, col. 1.
57. See The Hartford Courant, May 9, 1977, at 17, col. 1.
58. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1975) (current version at COl':l':. GEl':. STAT.
§ 10-153e (1977».
59. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1975) (current version at CO:,"!,:. GES. STAT.
§ 10-153f (1977».
60. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1975) (current version at Coss. GE..... STAT.
§ 10-153d (1977) required more negotiations if the fiscal authority rejected a contract.
But if the board and teacher organization could not reach agreement, even after adVisory
arbitration, the statute contained no clear guidance. In practice, the parties usually went
back into negotiations, sometimes with reluctance.
61. ld.
62. According to the Secretary, the State Department of Education intends to gh'e all
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effectiveness varied.
Arbitration under the 1965 Act was conducted before either a
panel of three arbitrators or a single arbitrator-the parties could
choose. 63 If the parties desired three arbitrators, each side would ap
point an advocate arbitrator, who would in tum select a neutral third
arbitrator. If the advocate arbitrators could not agree upon a neutral
arbitrator, the Secretary appointed the neutral from a panel. 64 Mem
bers of this panel were all chosen by the Governor.65 They appar
ently were not screened for neutrality.66 Some panel members were
regarded as unacceptable by either the teacher organizations or
boards of education. With a change in governors, some panel mem
bers were not reappointed, including some with established reputn
tions for neutrality.
V.

IMPASSE RESOLUTION: THE

1976

AMENDMENTS

A bill to require final and binding arbitration of all teacher dis
putes failed in 1975. 67 The 1976 Act as introduced contained a form
of final offer arbitration,68 but the provision was dropped as the bill

mediators formal training through a program with the Federal Mediation and Concilia
tion Service and the AAA.
63. "Unless the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to one arbitrator, their
designated arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator." CONN. GEN. STAT. ~ 1O-153f(c)
(1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(c) (1977».
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(c) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153f(c) (1977». According to the same section of the statute, if a party failed to
appoint its arbitrator, the Secretary would appoint that arbitrator, too.
65. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153f(a) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
~ 1O-153f(a) (1977».
66. The AAA will not place anyone on its labor panels who concurrently represents
participants in labor disputes. A person who makes a living representing either labor
or management while at the same time serving as a neutral arbitrator will, regardless
of actual integrity and fairness, be perceived as biased. Governor Grasso did appoint
to the governor's panel a person who represents participants in labor disputes. This is
most unfortunate, for if advocates for labor or managment appear on the panel, either
of two things will happen: the panel will be challenged in court because the third
arbitrator is not impartial; or the process will not be taken seriously by those who arc
intended to be served, and instead of resolving disputes, the panel of arbitrators will
simply alienate the parties and eventually the public. The arbitration panel has only the
power to persuade. Its recommendations are not binding. Therefore, it is of utmost im
portance that the impartial arbitrator not be chosen from the active labor relations bar.
67. An Act Concerning School Board-Teacher Negotiations, Comm. Bill No. 5625,
LCO No. 7276 (1975).
68. An Act Concerning School Board-Teacher Negotiations, H.B. No. 5117, LCO No.
719 (1976). Under this proposal the arbitrators would decide the dispute iss lie by issue,
choosing between the final position of either party. The theory behind the proposal is
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neared passage. The impasse procedures in the final bill remain es
sentially the same as under the 1965 Act, with some clumges in de
tails. For example, the new amendments 69 attempt to provide a dead
line for negotiations: bargaining must begin 180 days in advimce of
the budget submission date,70 which may vary from town to town. In
addition, to lessen the chances of town nullification, the 1976 Amend
ments require communication between the fiscal authority and the
board of education before bargaining. 71
In theory, the new system was designed to require agreement
before the budget was set,72 and to lessen the chance of rejection by
the municipality's fiscal authority by including it in the bargaining
process. 73 However, fiscal authorities continue to reject teacher con
tracts. In Berlin, for example, a ta.xpayer group successfully fought
two teacher contracts by forcing a referendum, causing a job action
by the teachers, which in tum led the ta.xpayer group to launch a
third referendum against a contract calling for a four and one-half
percent salary increase. 74 The new amendments cannot change the
fact that the real political power may lie outside of the finance com
mittee or the city council and may be lodged with some other politi
cal figure, or with the voters, or even with the political parties. Long,

obvious: each party trying to win in arbitration would present modemte propos,lls, .1IId
in the process, move toward the other.
69. 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts 76-403 (amending CONN. GEN. ST.o\T. §§ l()'l53a to 153g
(1975».
70. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1()'153d(b) (1977).
71. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1()'153d(a) (1977) requires the fiscal authority, u.loually the
board of finance or the board of selectmen, and the board of eduC'J.tion to "meet and
confer" with each other. This used to be the practice in some communities; now it is
mandatory. The same section of the new Act also allows, but does not appear to require,
the fiscal authority "to be present during negotiations" and to "pro\'ide such fiscoll in·
formation as may be requested by the board of education."
72. If after 90 days of negotiations, the parties cannot agree, the Act requires them to
commence arbitration. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1()'153f(c)(l) (1977). The chairperson of the
arbitration panel is supposed to set the first hearing within 13 days of appointment.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1()'153f(c)(2) (1977). The hearings are to be concluded within 20
days, and the report of the arbitrators must be issued within 15 days of the date the
hearing is closed. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10·153f(c)(3), (4) (1977). \\1lere the p.u1ies sub
mit 70 issues to the arbitrators, these time limits become impossible. In pmctice, they
are regularly ignored.
73. CO!l.'N. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d(a) (1977). The fisc,ll authority has the right to be
"present during negotiations." This probably means that the person so designated is not
a voting member of the negotiation team of the board of education. From the wording of
the Act, it would appear that the board of education cannot force that person's presence
but the fiscal authority can.
74. The Hartford Courant, May 9, 1977, at 16, col. 1.
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drawn-out negotiations still occur. 75
In the opinion of some, the new law has not had much impact on
the way the various participants in the negotiation process behave.
But with the new deadlines, the arbitration season has been
lengthened. 76
75. Consider, for example, the negotiation history of the 1977-78 contract in North
Branford:
NEGOTIATIONS CHRONOLOGY

September 21, 1976

Opening of Negotiations

October 12, 1976
October 13,

Exchange Proposals

November 2, 1976
November 3,
November 9,
November 10,
November 16,
November 17,
November 22,
November 23,
November 29,
November 30,

Negotiation Sessions
"
"
"
"
"
"

December 14, 1976

Mediation Session

March 21, 1977
March 22,

Negotiations
Board of Education Budget
Hearing with Town Coun
cil
Negotiations
Public Budget Hearing

March 25,
March 30,

"

"

"

"
"
"
"

"
"
"

"

April 6, 1977
April 13,
April 19,

Negotiations
Negotiations
Budget Hearing with Town
Council

May 2,1977
May 4,
May 9,
May 23,

Annual Town Budget Meet
ing
Negotiations
Mediation
Mediation

Aug. 2, 1977

Arbitration Hearing

This information is taken from the brief submitted by the Branford Board of Education
to the Board of Arbitrators. The author served as the neutral arbitrator on this panel.
As of August 15, 1977, the parties had not yet reached agreement, although tht,
budget for the 1977-78 fiscal year had been fixed for some time.
76. Because only a few engage in teacher-board arbitration sessions as advocatl's,
and fewer still as arbitrators, arranging mutually convenient hearing dates is frequently
difficult. Spreading the arbitrations over more months has eased the problem.
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The 1976 Amendments give to the Secretary to the State Board
of Education the power to appoint arbitrators from the governor's
panel or from any other panel. 77 The obvious purpose was to blunt
the criticism directed at the arbitrators, and to insulate their selection
from the political process. How the Secretary chooses to exercise this
new power is crucial. The number of arbitrators acting in this field is
quite small. Presently, the Secretary continues to make single ap
pointments if the parties cannot agree. The AAA, on the other hand,
provides the parties with lists of five or seven names, and appoints a
single arbitrator only after the parties repeatedly fail to make a selec
tion from the lists. The AAA system gives the parties greater control
over the selection of the arbitrator. On the other hand, the system
used by the Secretary only comes into play if the parties C'.lnnot agree
among themselves on the neutral arbitrator. 78
Under the 1965 Act, mediators were hired and paid by the State
Department of Education. 79 Under the 1976 Amendments, the
mediators are chosen by the parties from a state list,80 and are paid
by the parties. 81 This practice is a departure from the federal pattern.
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service provides mediators,
paid by the government, to parties in the private sector. 82 The Con
necticut Department of Labor maintains several full-time mediators.
who are used in the private and public sectors without cost to the
parties. 83 The practice of maintaining full-time mediators appears
superior to the present system used in education. All of the
77. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(c)(I) (1977). By implication, this section allows
the Secretary to create another panel of arbitrators, or to use arbitrators from the AAA
panel. Appointments need no longer be from the governor's panel.
78. Knowing that the Secretary will appoint a single arbitrator may, In some cases,
inspire the parties to choose a neutral arbitrator.
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(b) (1975) (current version at CoNN. GE.~. STAT.
§ 10-153f(b) (1977».
80. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(b) (1977). This section also allows the partie~ to
choose the mediator from "any other panel of qualified mediators." The ~.lnle ~ectioll
also authorizes the Secretary to deSignate a mediator.
8!. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(b) (1977). Despite the language in till' .Ibove ~t.lt
ute, not all teacher mediators are paid by the parties. In the event of a strike. the Se~
retary may send in an intervenor, who performs a mediation function. but who is not
paid by the parties. In a strike, one side or the other or both may not enter mlodiation
with much enthusiasm. To require that they pay for the peacemakl'r liMy han'
psychological disadvantages, and handicap the mediator. The statute should probably be
amended so that the state provides the mediator as a service to the public. To do ~o
would conform to the practice of federal and Connecticut mediation wrvit'e\.
82. W. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BAI\CAININC 34.
55-57 (1971).
83. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-472,31-96. -99 (1977).
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mediators used in educational disputes have other, full-time jobs. In
the event of a strike, the Secretary must run through the list to de
termine who, if anyone, is available. 84 The state might do better with
a full-time mediator in education. Recognizing some of these prob
lems, the Department of Education has begun to implement a formal
system for training its part-time mediators, a valuable step.
Both the 1976 Amendments 85 and the 1965 Act8S allow the par
ties to choose between a single arbitrator and a tripartite arbitration
panel to conduct the advisory arbitration. In practice, the overwhelm
ing majority of deadlocks have been referred to tripartite panels com
prised of one arbitrator chosen by the board of education, one by the
teacher organization, and a third arbitrator chosen either by the other
two arbitrators or by the Secretary to the State Board of Education.
The chairperson of the arbitration panel is impartial; the other two
are advocate arbitrators. 87
VI.

IMPASSE RESOLUTION: THE NATURE OF ARBITRATION

Arbitration under the Connecticut statute may not be fully un
derstood by the public. The process is called arbitration by the
statute,88 but that does not mean that the process is as judicial in
nature as the arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim, or the arbi
tration of a breach of contract claim. Following a recent arbitration, an
advocate arbitrator came under public criticism for having contacted
84. On occasion, none of the mediators has been available, at least not immediately.
85. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(c)(1) (1977).
86. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(c) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153f(c)(1) (1977».
87. Before 1969, § 10-153f(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes spoke of "an Im
partial board of three arbitrators." Although the Act also stated that each party was to
appoint an arbitrator, who would then join in selecting the third, and despite the fact
that such tripartite boards are commonly used in labor arbitration with no one expecting
anyone but the neutral arbitrator to be truly neutral, a superior court ruled in 1968 that
all three arbitrators should be neutral because, thought the court, without citing any
authority whatsoever, "An advisory decision by three impartial arbitrators is more help
ful and beneficial to the public than a decision by a board containing just one Impartial
arbitrator." West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. West Hartford Bd. of Educ., 27 Conn. Supp.
421, 427, 241 A.2d 780, 783 (Super. Ct. 1968). The judge failed to understand that ad
visory arbitration is one step in the negotiation process, one more method of placing
pressure on both sides to settle. It contains elements of both arbitration and negotiation.
The above decision, if allowed to stand, would have removed the element of negotia
tion from the arbitration process. In 1969, the legislature overturned this decision by
removing the reference to "an impartial board of three arbitrators," making it clear that
the parties may appoint advocate arbitrators to the panel. 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 811
(codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153f(c) (1977». The current Act simply refers to the
three arbitrators as the "panel." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153f(c)(1), (2) (1977).
88. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1977).
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during the deliberations the party who appointed him. In ordinary
arbitration, such contact would not be proper, but in "interest arbi
tration" as practiced in Connecticut under the Teacher Negotiation
Act, such contact is common, and may be invaluable.
What are these three arbitrators supposed to be doing? Are they
negotiators pure and simple, creatures and extensions of the parties
who appointed them, with the neutral arbitrator there to serve as a
mediator? Or are they independent, answering only to a personal
sense of what is "fair"? In answering these questions, it should be
kept in mind that the arbitration awards are not binding. 89 Either
side may reject even a unanimous award. Rejection me~ms f.'lilure,
continued negotiations, heightened tensions, possible job actions, and
perhaps even a teacher strike. However, a unanimous award does
create public pressure for settlement which may be otherwise absent.
A party that rejects a unanimous award is, in effect, rejecting the
recommendations of its own representatives on the arbitration panel.
The other side of the dispute can argue to the public, in effect,
"Their own arbitrator thought this settlement was reasonable--why
don't they?"90
Thus, although the arbitrators are appointed because bargaining
has failed, the process of arbitrating the terms of a new contract is an
extension of the bargaining process itself. Teacher organiz.'ltions and
boards of education recognize this fact in the careful way they select
their advocate arbitrators.91 Does this mean that the party arbitrators
are simply extensions of the parties? Do they have any indepen
dence? In theory, they are independent; in practice, they are as in
dependent as the individuals playing those roles choose. Because the
award is not binding, "independent" advocate arbitrators may be
more willing to agree to a settlement which is less (if from labor) or
more (if from management) than their side may have liked. Because
the arbitrator's decision is not binding, an advocate arbitrator has
more independence than a party negotiator (i.e., the person doing
the actual collective bargaining for the party), who goes beyond in
structions at considerable peril.
89. uThe decision of the arbitrators or the single arbitmtor shall be .ltI\'I~ory .mtl
shall not be binding upon the parties to the dispute." Cmm. CES. STAT. § 10-153f(cIH)
(1977).
90. This, in a nutshell, is why hvo advocate arbitrators plu~ one nelltr.1l .lfe ,uperior
to three neutral arbitrators in advisory arbitration over te.wher l"Ontr.lch.
91. In many cases, the advocate arbitrators are more important to tht' Jlroce,~ th.1Il
the neutral. Unless all three agree, the award may be wortllle~~. and lI,ually .Igreement
is only possible through compromise.
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Thus, the advocate arbitrators are of crucial importance. In fact,
their participation in the arbitration of new contracts is sufficiently
valuable to warrant amending the statute so as to make the tripartite
panel mandatory. Several factors support such an amendment. First,
because the result is nonbinding, the award of a single arbitrator
often carries no practical weight whatsoever. Second, in the event of
a conflict between what is "fair and equitable" and what is "possible,"
however those terms may be defined, the advocate arbitrators are
indispensable. They may have a much better "feel" of the situation
than the neutral. They may be able to determine which of the issues
are important, which crucial, and which interesting but not signifi
cant. Frequently, what to the neutral may appear significant may not
be so to the parties, and at times the issue that most divides the
parties may not appear to be of much importance to an outsider.
Third, the advocate arbitrators enable each party to have its position
argued yet another time. In a complicated arbitration, no matter how
ably presented, questions frequently arise about certain facts or evi
dence. Having two persons responsible not only to the parties but to
the process of resolving the dispute makes it all the more probable
that all points will be thoroughly debated and considered. Thus, the
quality of the work and the value of the arbitration award would be
significantly enhanced by requiring tripartite arbitration panels to
hear disputes over new contract terms. 92
Because the arbitration process is both an extension of the bar
gaining process and a hearing before two semi-independent souls and
one fully neutral member, the party negotiators presenting arguments
to the arbitration panel may be tempted to under-present their case,
and rely instead upon the negotiation skills of their advocate arbi
trator. In other words, party negotiators may choose to have the "real"
negotiation done in the arbitration setting rather than at the collec
tive bargaining table. When the parties bring seventy or eighty issues
to the arbitrators, as has happened, something has gone seriously
awry during bargaining. One or both sides has been unreasonably
stubborn, or, because of internal dissension, has been unable to unite
behind a bargaining position and is solving the problem by allowing
each point of view to be expressed at the arbitration hearing. There
may be no solution to this problem. Limit the number of issues that
may be arbitrated, and you may encourage the parties to refuse to
bargain effectively on any more than the "magic number." Fail to
92. Grievance arbitration is a different institution with dilTerent assumptions, prot'l"
dUTes, and purposes. The discussion in the text is limited to "inten'st" arbitration.
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limit the number, and you invite four days of hearings concerning
eighty issues. Bringing a multitude of issues before the arbitrators
increases the probability that the arbitrators will disagree among
themselves, and guarantees that the cost of the arbitration process
will rise.
There are no statutory standards for teacher contract arbitration
in Connecticut. Neither the old statute nor the 1976 Amendments
dictates standards to guide the arbitrators,93 but the absence of
statutory standards makes little practical difference. The types of
standards used in interests arbitration are well known. 94 The basic
notion is comparison. Whether a teacher is worth X dollars or Y dol
lars depends upon a comparison with what others are making at the
same time--other teachers in the area, in comparable towns in Con
necticut, and in the region. Wages in other fields are also cited with
frequency. The cost of living is argued about as often as the town's
ability to pay. Applying these standards is frequently difficult, but
when they absolutely conflict, as happens when a town must layoff
93. A 1975 bill, introduced but never passed, contained five standards to guide the
arbitrators, whose decision was, under the bill, final and binding. Those standards were:
(A) The recommendation of the Secretary for settlement as provided for in sub
section (b) of this section and the bargaining between the parties prior to the
submission of the issues to arbitration; (B) Comparison of the salaries and other
conditions of employment of the certified professional employees invoh'ed in
the arbitration with salaries and other conditions of employment of other em·
ployees performing similar services in comparable communities or in comparable
jobs in private employment; (C) The public interest and the financial ability of
the municipality or school district to pay the cost of the arbitrators' award; (D)
Changes in the cost of living since the last agreement between the parties on
salary schedules; (E) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing. which
are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of
salaries and other conditions of employment through \'oluntary collective bar·
gaining, mediation, fact·finding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in
the public service or in private employment.
H.B. 5625, LCO No. 7276 (1975).
The first bill introduced in the 1976 session on teacher bargaining, H.B. 5117, LCO
No. 719, before it was amended, provided for the following criteria:
In deciding each question, the panel shall take into account (A) The negotia·
tion between the parties prior to arbitration and the recommendation of the
Secretary . . . . (B) The public interest and financial capability of the school
district; (C) The salaries. hours and other conditions of employment pre\".liling
in the state labor market; (D) Changes in the cost of Ih'ing; and tE) TIll' in·
terests and welfare of the certified professional employee.
When binding arbitration was deleted from the proposed act. so were the st.lnd.lrds.
The laws of some states include a statement of standards. Scc gCllcrallu ~lcAvo>'. 8/r1l/'
ing Arbitration of Contract Terms: A Neu: A/J/Jroach to the Resollltiull of Dis,,"te~ il/
the Pllblic Sector, 72 COLU!II. L. REV. 1192 (1972).
94. See gel/erall!l F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI. slI/Jra note 15. at 745-96.
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teachers for lack of funds while inflation chews away at the pay of
those who remain, arbitration is not equipped to resolve the dispute.
It then serves merely to delay the day of the crunch, when the
teachers either accept far less than their counterparts in more fortu
nate towns, or engage in an illegal work stoppage.
When an impending strike presents itself in arbitration, the
question for the arbitrators, and especially the neutral, is how to
react. Should the neutral be guided by the strength of the union to
strike or by the power of the community to resist? Should bargaining
power ever be a factor in such a situation? This writer argued to the
contrary as chairman of the panel in the arbitration that preceded the
New Haven teacher strike of 1975, in which teachers were bussed off
to jail for defying an injunction. 95 The opinion, in which neither the
union nor the management arbitrator joined, but which is a public
document and therefore not subject to the usual rules governing con
fidentiality of arbitrators' awards, made the following points:
The Board and the Dissent contend, with obvious con
viction, that we should abandon the traditional criteria for
setting wages and recommend that there be no increases
and no increments. They contend that the budget contains
no funds for any increases; that any request for additional
funds would be futile; and that the politics of the situation
call for the first no increase, no increment adjustment since
1936. Having no hope whatsoever for any additional infusion
of funds, they contend that the money for any increases
would have to come from within the existing budget, an ob
vious impossibility, unless the Board decides to layoff hun
dreds of teachers. Faced with a choice of massive layoffs on
the one hand or no increments and no increases on the
other hand, the Board and Dissent contend that the lesser
of the two evils is no increases. They contend that massive
layoffs will impair education, destroy morale, and hurt the
students' education.
The Union Arbitrator argued, with equal vigor and sin
cerity, that New Haven will fund any additional increases
95. Ninety teachers were held in contempt and confined at Camp Hartell in Windsor
Locks. See New Haven Journal-Courier, Nov. 19, 1975, at 1, col. 1. On Monday, Nov.
24, 1975, the strike was settled. According to the New Haven Journal-Courier, Nov. 24,
1975, at 42, col. 2, "A sympathy strike by the school employees last week forced the
closing of schools and a citywide coalition of labor unions has threatened a half-day
strike for Tuesday if the 90 [jailed teachers] are still in jail."
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without layoffs. And therein lies the problem of using as a
criterion for wage determination the politics of the situation.
Each side makes conflicting predictions as to what the City
will or won't pay. Each side may be relying on inside infor
mation, hunches, statements by political leaders, or news
paper editorials. Each side gives a different reading of the
political winds. These winds are usually strong but never
steady. A Board wind may shift into a breeze favoring the
teachers, and shift back again. The Chairman believes that
the only way to discover what will or won't be accepted is to
make an effort to arrive at a fair wage figure, using tradi
tional wage arguments. Otherwise, the Arbitrators are re
duced to weathervanes, being blown first this way and then
that way as the political currents swirl around them. Were
the Chairman to follow the implied suggestion of the Board,
so that the will of the City to resist funding would become
the main issue, the wage setting process would tum away
from an inquiry into what is a fair and equitable wage in
crease. The panel would then be asking about the will of the
City to resist payment; and inquiring into the will of the
teachers to wrest payment. This would lead us down a road
that ends abruptly at the precipice of power. The Chairman
rejects as a criterion for setting wages the argument of rela
tive power. That one side or the other has the power to
force capitulation does not make the exercise of that power
right. Power does not necessarily make for a fair criterion,
and power can be a two-edged sword. Once we concede in
this case that New Haven has the power to offer nothing,
then the next time we may have to concede that the Union
has the power to force payment. Once we admit that be
cause the City has cut the Board's budget, nothing further
can be done, we virtually invite the use of countervailing
power from the other side. Whether the teachers could
force the Board to capitulate, or whether the Board has the
power to force the teachers to capitulate, is irrelevant to this
inquiry of what is a fair settlement. The Chairman believes
that it is not fair for the City to be forced into paying the
teachers' demands, nor is it fair for the City to force the
teachers into accepting nothing. 96

96. Opinion of the Neutral Arbitrator in dispute between the City of New Haven Bd.
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This essay into the use of power as a criterion in wage arbitra
tion was, of course, utterly ineffective. Shortly after it was issued,
the teachers struck. The arbitration process was, in that dispute, ir
relevant.
VII.

IMPASSE RESOLUTION: TEACHER STRIKES

The old act prohibited teacher strikes,97 but could not prevent
them. 98 While continuing the prohibition against such strikes,99 the
1976 Amendments outlaw the ex parte injunction. 100 This means as a
of Educ. and the New Haven Fed'n of Teachers, Oct. 20, 1975 (on file in the office of
the Commissioner of Education).
97. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 1O-153e (1977).
98. The reasons for teachers' strikes are varied. Perhaps some insight into the motI
vation may be provided by the teachers themselves. Thomas P. Mondani of the Connec
ticut Education Association explained the reasons why teachers strike in an article re
printed in the New Haven Register, Nov. 23, 1975, at 3B, col. 5. In that article, he
states:
Watertown, East Haven, Cromwell, Bristol, Shelton-towns which in normal
classifications such as population, geographic location, student population, or
economic rankings have little in common, except that the teachers were on
strike this year....
Why do teachers strike? ...
Teachers strike because of a deep frustration with a system which refuses to
recognize and resolve the real problems teachers continue to face. Over
crowded classroom [sic], lack of supplies, lack of programs, inadequate griev
ance procedures to settle disputes, salary gains severely eroded by inflation,
[and] job insecurity due to unfair layoff procedures are among the list in nearly
every town .
. . . [T]eachers, realizing that they and they alone may bear tremendous per
sonal risk since political leaders will not, that all reasonable efforts to produce
agreements and provide solutions have failed, that no other meaningful alterna·
tives resolve disputes [sic] are available, that they then must make the painful
moral decision whether or not to strike.
Others hold that teachers strike for the same reason as any other employees-"more."
99. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1977).
100. Before the 1976 Amendments, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1975), after stating
that strikes were illegal, continued as follows: "This provision may be enforced in the
superior court for any county in which said board of education is located by an ex parte
temporary injunction ...." The quoted language was deleted in 1976. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 10-153e (1977). The new enforcement language reads: "This provision may be
enforced in the superior court for any county in which said board of education is located
by an injunction issued by said court or a judge thereof pursuant to sections 52-471 to
52-479 inclusive." The legislative intent, therefore, would appear to require notice and
hearing before a teachers' strike is enjoined. Although CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-473
(1977) permits an ex parte injunction if "it clearly appears that irreparable loss or dam
age will result," apparently the General Assembly found that at least the first day or two
of a teachers' strike does not cause irreparable injury.
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practical matter that striking teachers are not enjoined until the sec
ond or third day of the strike, and they are not called up on con
tempt charges until the fourth or fIfth day. The change allows the
teachers an extra day or two until the law lands on them. Once
teachers strike, psychology becomes more important than law. Some
judges, recognizing this, attempt to mediate the dispute themselves,
in their chambers,lOl all the while holding on to the power to hold
the teachers in contempt. Other judges have taken a different tack.
When the New Haven teachers struck in 1975, Judge Saden held
them in contempt and jailed all of the leaders and seventy-eight of
the strikers. 102 While the judge was certainly following the letter of
101. Judge Hill, upon enjoining the Greenwich teachers' strike of 1976, said he
would fine the teachers S100 and their organization SlO,OOO per day if the strike con
tinued. He declined to jail the teachers, but said he would leave that option open, and
offered to mediate the dispute. The parties accepted the offer, and bargained in the
Fairfield County Superior Court Building. See The Hartford Courant, No\'. 24, 1976, at
30, col. 5.
102. The New Haven Journal-Courier, Nov. 19, 1975, at I, col. I, Judge Saden's
comments to the striking teachers were reported in the New Haven papers:
THE COURT: I think what some of you ladies and gentlemen don't seem to
understand is that you have placed yourselves in the category of being law
breakers....
You are supposed to inspire the young, impressionable minds that >'ou teach
and your credibility with your students has been seriously impaired b>' your
conduct in violating the law. You, above all other types of persons, should have
been aware of this long ago.
What can you say to your students when you return to school and the)'
pointA VOICE: I would like to answer
THE COURT: Don't be a wise guy.
A VOICE: I am not, but I volunteer to answer that question.
THE COURT: These are rhetorical questions, and don't get too smart or
you'll wind up in further trouble.
Of course, it is not a matter of concern for me in pronouncing sentence upon
you for this civil contempt, but I merely point out to you tllat as law breakers, it
would seem to me that the Board of Education would have the right to dismiss
you from your jobs, if they saw fit to do so.
But if you think it is smart to violate the law, if you think it is smart to decide
for yourselves what you think is right, regardless of what the Legislature has
said is right, then you have taken the first step toward what amounts to anarchy.
If everyone of us is free to decide for himself what he will do or won't do and
completely disregard the law, we no longer have the kind of democrae>' this
country is supposed to be. It is all well and good to talk about freedom and we
all believe in it, but freedom abused is no freedom at all.
The course of violating the law in the fashion that you have chosen to do is
purely self-defeating, it is one in which you cannot possibly prevail because it
is a confrontation not with the Board of Education-you are not here fighting
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the law, some observers believed that he actually increased the
resolve l03 and the relative bargaining power of the strikers. l04 One
can never know for certain, and no one advocates running a con
trolled experiment with another strike in New Haven. Nonetheless.
some management lawyers believe that the jailing of teachers only
serves to increase their bargaining power, while others hold that the
jailing of union leaders, such as happened in Shelton,105 may bring a
strike to an abrupt end. Since both sides may point to strikes in Con
necticut to prove their point, the matter remains unresolved. How
ever, it is the exception, not the rule, for the judiciary to jail striking
teachers. The New Haven experience is atypical.
The 1976 Amendments have not solved the problem of impasse
resolution. Whether the state will see fewer strikes under the
changes remains to be seen. Where strikes are caused by the lack of
funds, no change in the bargaining laws can make a difference. Now
that the present system of funding school education has been de
clared unconstitutional by Horton v. Meskill,lo6 more state funds
must be made available to the poorer communities. However, not all
teacher strikes have occurred in poverty pockets, as proven by the
recent strike in Greenwich.
When a town is forced for lack of funds to layoff tenured
teachers, as is happening now in Connecticut, bargaining over in
creases in pay for those teachers who remain is difficult. Whether
teachers ought to have the right to strike, or whether impasses
should be broken by binding arbitration, are questions which are at
bottom political. Both methods present problems. A strike cannot
produce money where none exists, although a strike may produce
the Board of Education this morning-you are fighting a court order, and the
confrontation is between the courts and you.
The court has no alternative in this case but to send all of you to jail, and to
impose a fine on each of you, per diem, of $250.
I find you all in contempt. I impose a jail sentence upon each one of you. I
impose a fine of $250, per diem, on each one of you.
The New Haven Register, Nov. 23, 1975, at 3B, col. 1.
103. According to one account, "[Als the mass jailing grew more imminent, teaclwrs
seemed firmer than ever in their resolve to 'go it all the way: " The New Haven Regis
ter, Nov. 18, 1975, at 1, col. 7.
104. As the strike progressed, other school employees engaged in a sympathy strike,
and "[a] citywide coalition of labor unions ... threatened a half-day [general) strike for
Tuesday if the 90 were still in jail:' The New Haven Journal-Courier, Nov. 24, 1975, at
42, col. 2.
105. The Hartford Courant, Nov. 14, 1975, at 37, col. 3.
106. 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
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money which was only in hiding. Final offer arbitration may induce
better bargaining, more compromise by both sides, but it may also
produce contracts that neither side can live with. It would appear
that so long as the two major teacher organizations in Connecticut
maintain different points of view over which ought to replace the
present system, final offer arbitration or the right to strike, the Gen
eral Assembly will do nothing.
VIII.

UNFAffi LABOR PRACTICES

The 1965 Act contained no unfair labor practice sections. The
Act did require both labor and management to bargain in good
faith;107 and it required boards of education to give rival teacher or
ganizations "equal access" to teachers and school facilities. lOS The Act
also prohibited the employer from interfering with teachers who ex
ercised their rights of self-organization. lo9 But that was all. The 1965
Act did not contain the equivalent of subsection B(a) or 8(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act.ll0 In addition, the 1965 Connecticut
Act did not give to an administrative agency the power to remedy vio
lations of the duty of good faith bargaining, or the duty not to inter
fere with teachers' rights, or the duty to give equal access. No labor
board enforced these rights. If a dispute arose concerning them. the
only recourse was litigation, a costly and time-consuming procedure.
All of this changed in 1976. The Amendments ll1 prohibit certain
conduct by both labor and management. Management is prohibited
from 1) interfering with the exercise of rights under the Act;112
2) dominating or interfering with a teacher organization;113 3) dis
criminating against a teacher who invokes the Act;114 4) refusing to
107. Carom. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1975) (current version at CoSN. GE.~. STAT.
§ 10-153d (1977». The provisions concerning good faith bargaining are now located in
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1977).
108. This applied if no organization represented the teachers. See CONN. GE.~. STAT.
§ 100153d (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1977)). During elec
tions, both organizations had a right to equal access under Cmm. GE.~. STAT. § 10-153c
(1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153c (1977».
109. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153a (1975) (current version at COSS. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153a (1977».
110. National Labor Relations Act § 8,29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
111. 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts 76-403 (amending CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 100153a to 153g
(1975». The specific amendments which prohibit this conduct are codified at CoSN.
GEN. STAT. § 100153e(b)-(d) (1977).
112. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-I53e(b)(I) (1977).
113. Carom. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(b)(2) (1977).
114. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(b)(3) (1977).
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bargain in good faith;115 and 5) refusing to participate in good faith in
mediation or arbitration. 116 As will be seen, the most important of
these, and the one which will probably involve the most litigation, is
the refusal to bargain in good faith. The union unfair labor practice
provisions track management provisions (except that labor cannot be
charged with domination or interference)117 and add a new one: "so
liciting or advocating support from public school students."uB
"Good faith bargaining" is defined by the 1976 Amendments just
as it is in the National Labor Relations Act: 119 the duty to meet, and
attempt to reach agreement, and the executing of a written contract
incorporating any agreement. Like the National Labor Relations
Act120 the Amendments provide that "such obligation shall not com
pel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession. "121 And, in a most Significant decision, the General As
sembly in 1976 gave the power to remedy unfair labor practices to
the State Board of Labor Relations. 122 Now, for the first time in
Connecticut, teachers and boards of education have an administrative
agency, with expertise in labor relations, to resolve the difficult and
sensitive questions that arise during bargaining.
Adding unfair labor practices to the Labor Board's jurisdiction
will probably prove to be a mixed blessing. Boards and teacher or
ganizations with honest differences of opinion over what is bargain
able may now resolve those differences in an orderly way. But incor
poration of the language of the National Labor Relations Act cannot
help but make teacher bargaining more complicated. Regulation of
activity by law inevitably invites lawyers into the process. What may
have been informal and flexible may now become rigid and technical.
And now that the Labor Board is available to enforce the unfair labor
practice provisions in the Act, one side or the other invariably will
attempt to use the Labor Board as a bargaining lever.
Perhaps the most immediate and dramatic effect of the Amend
ments will be to require management to bargain before making
changes in working conditions. Does the employer have the right
115. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(b)(4) (1977).
116. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153e(b)(5) (1977).
117. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153e(c)(1)-(5) (1977).
118. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(c)(5) (1977).
119. Compare § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970),
with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(d) (1977).
120. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
121. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(d) (1977).
122. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153e(e)-(i) (1977).
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during the life of the agreement to make changes in conditions which
are not covered by the agreement? Professors Cox and Dunlop an
swered this question with a qualified "no," in an article written about
the private sector almost thirty years ago. 123 Before an employer may
make changes in major conditions not covered by the contract, it
must first bargain with the union. 124 The unilateral change in a condi
tion of employment is a refusal to bargain. This is elementary labor
law. The rule applies with equal vigor after the ex-piration of the
contract. 125
The State Board of Labor Relations has adopted the Cox-Dunlop
view. 126 For example, the Shelton Board of Education stopped pay
ing wage increments to nonteachers after the contract ex-pired, and
was ordered to resume payments because the reduction took place
without bargaining to an impasse. 127 Before this decision, some
boards of education refused to grant increments after the contract
expired, in order to pressure the employees to come to an agree
ment. 128 This can no longer be done prior to impasse. By making the
refusal to bargain an unfair labor practice, and by placing enforce
ment power in the Labor Board, the General Assembly has incorpo
rated the theories that prevail in the private sector governing unilat
eral changes in conditions.
The 1976 Amendments also mean that the state now has an effi
cient method for resolving disputes over what is bargainable. Under
the 1965 Act, when the parties had an honest difference of opinion on
123. Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During tIle Ternl of .<\11 Exist
ing Agreement, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1097 (1950).
124. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
125. Once the parties have reached an impasse, however, the employer is free to
make unilateral changes. AAA Motor Lines, 215 N.L.R.B. 793, 88 L.R.R.~t. 1253 (1974).
See also NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
126. See Town of Ridgefield, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1537 l~ta)' 16,
1977) (unilateral change in grooming standards violated the duty to bargain): Town of
Hamden, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1484 aan. 24, 1977) (unilateral institu
tion of compensation for new position violated the duty to bargain): City of Stamford,
State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1473 (Dec. 27, 1976) (unilateral change in
gasoline benefit violated the duty to bargain); City of Willimantic, State Bd. of Labor
Relations Dec. No. 1455 (Nov. 23, 1976) (finding an impasse): Town of Newington,
State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1116 (Mar. 22, 1973); City of Milford, State Bd. of
Labor Relations Dec. No. 1973 aan. 19, 1973).
127. Shelton Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. :-10. 1458 (Dec. 8,
1976). See also Ledyard Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. :-10. 1564 (Aug.
15, 1977); Windsor Police Dep't, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. !IIo. 1064 (~lay 3,
1972).
128. The Hartford Board of Education withheld increments in 1975. See Hartford
Fed'n of Teachers v. Hartford Bd. of Educ., No. 199139 (Super. Ct. No\,. 20, 1975).
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the matter, they had no choice but to litigate. The 1972 Connecticut
Supreme Court decision of West Hartford Education Association, Inc.
v. DeCourcyl29 was an effort to find guidance on the question of
which subjects are mandatory subjects of bargaining. DeCourcy ruled
that hours of employment were not a mandatory subject of ne
gotiation. l3o The court determined that the length or schedule of the
work day was not included in the statutory language "conditions of
employment." The result has never been overturned. l3l
There remain a number of issues regarding the duty to bargain
which will now be resolved by the Labor Board: Does the duty to
bargain include issues such as summer school?l32 part-time teachers?
substitutes?133 medical benefits for retired teachers? early retire
ment? selection of coaches? adult education? hiring of teacher aides?
the selection of projects for federal funding? The Labor Board will
have to develop an approach, using for guidance the statute, the
unique nature of public education, and precedents from the private
sector.l34 The important point is this: the participants in teacher bar
gaining now have a place to go to resolve questions of what is negoti
129. 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972).
130. The 1965 Act required bargaining over "salaries and other conditions of em
ployment...." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-153d (1977». The words in the National Labor Relations Act § 8{d) are, "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158{d) (1970). The
Connecticut Supreme Court in DeCourcy found that the difference in words Indicated a
difference in meaning. 162 Conn. at 578-80, 295 A.2d at 534. Thus, boards need not
bargain over the length of the school day and the school calendar. 162 Conn. at 580, 295
A.2d at 534. By the same reasoning, "conditions of employment" would mean somc
thing different from "terms and conditions of employment." What the difference would
be is unclear.
131. When the 1976 Amendments were first introduced, the duty to bargain wns
defined as encompassing "salaries, hours, and other conditions of employment." Raised
Comm. Bill No. 5117, § 4, LCO No. 719. The Substitute Raised Comm. Bill No. 5117
dropped the term "hours."
132. The State Board of Labor Relations has answered, "Yes." West Hartford Bd. of
Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1533 (June 28, 1977) ("We conclude that
the teaching of summer school is bargaining unit work and thnt those who are employed
for such teaching are bargaining unit employees.")
133. A substitute employed regularly 184 days each year is a member of the bargain
ing unit, not a "temporary substitute." Wethersfield Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Lnbor
Relations Dec. No. 1560 (July 26, 1977). See also Wallingford Bd. of Educ., Stnte Bd. of
Labor Relations Dec. No. 1565 (Aug. 16, 1977).
134. The State Department of Education issued extensive guidelines in 1975 cover
ing the scope of negotiations. See Zirkel, Guidelines for Teacher-Board Negotlatlolls III
Connecticut, 50 CONN. B.J. 127 (1976). These guidelines are neither statutes nor regula
tions, and their impact on the actual conduct of bargaining has been only marginal.
Whether the State Board of Labor Relations will use these guidelines as persuasivc
authority is not known.
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able. Before 1976, as a practical matter,135 they had nowhere to go.
Although such questions may not be as crucial in teacher bar
gaining as in the private sector-a union under the National Labor
Relations Act may strike over a mandatory subject of bargaining, but
not over a permissive one, whereas teachers may not strike at all
-still there are cases in which the scope of bargaining is well worth
litigating. In one of the first cases involving teachers decided by the
State Board of Labor Relations, the West Hartford Board of Educa
tion was ordered to bargain over summer schooJ.136 And in another
case, the Wethersfield Board of Education was ordered to bargain
over the salary of a long-term substitute. 137

x.

MISCELLANEOUS

Among the other 1976 changes which are by no means minor in
nature are these: The agency shop appears to have been outlawed;138
mediators cannot be forced to testify about negotiations;139 the
teacher organizations must designate an agent for service of pro
cess;l40 and impasse arbitrators and mediators are entitled to receive
the prevailing fee for such service. 141
The General Assembly has required university professors at state
institutions to join the union or pay the equivalent in dues;l42 state
135. The guidelines of the State Department of Education defined the scope of bar
gaining, but could not coerce unwilling parties into compliance.
136. West Hartford Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dt.'C. No. 1553 Uune
28, 1977}.
137. Wethersfield Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1560 Uulr 26,
1977}.
138. This was done br adding to the right not to "join" a teacher organization, the
right not to "assist" one. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153a (1975) lcilll Coss.
GEN. STAT. § 10-153a (1977).
139. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1977). ("In any ch·il or criminal caSt" anr pro
ceeding preliminary thereto, or in any legislative or administrative proceeding, a medi
ator shall not disclose any confidential communication made to him in the course of his
duties unless the party making such communication wah'es such privilege.")
140. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153i (1977).
141. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(b), (c)(I) (1977). Before the Amendments, arbi
trators were entitled to $60 per day. See COl'.'N. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1975) (current
version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1977», setting the fcc at the Coss. GE...... STAT.
§ 31-94 (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-94 (1977)) mte, or $60,
perhaps a fair sum when first enacted, but today only one-fifth the pre\'ailing mtes for
nationally recognized arbitrators.
142. See 1975 Conn. Pub. Acts 75-566 (codified at CONN. GES. STAT. § 5-280 (1977)).
providing in part:
If an exclusive representative has been deSignated for tile employees in an ap
propriate collective bargaining unit, each employee in such unit who is not a
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policy with respect to public school teachers is precisely the opposite:
the 1976 Amendments appear to have outlawed the agency shop.143
The reason for this difference in policy appears to be political. Now
that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the Constitution
does not outlaw the agency shop in public schools,144 the teacher
organizations may attempt to change the Teacher Act.
The 1976 Amendments prohibit mediators from revealing confi
dential information. 145 This amendment was prompted by a subpoena
issued to one of the state mediators 146 in a dispute over whether an
impasse was reached during bargaining. The mediator never testified.
But the unresolved legal issue remained. 147 Mediation depends upon
the integrity of the mediator, and the absolute confidentiality of
communications. 148 If a party knew that the other side could sub
poena the mediator and force that person to testify about what was
said, mediation would no longer be effective. The Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service will not permit its mediators to testify in any

member of the exclusive representative shall be required, as a condition of con
tinued employment, to pay to such organization for the period that it is the
exclusive representative, an amount equal to the regular dues, fees and assess
ments that a member is charged.
This provision, in the State Employees Collective Bargaining Act, applies to any state
employee, not just university professors. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-270(a) (1977).
143. See note 138 supra.
144. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977). However, the Court also
ruled that public employees could not be compelled to pay for "ideological activities
unrelated to collective bargaining." 97 S. Ct. at 1800. That portion of the dues spent for
political purposes must, upon demand, be returned to the protesting employee. 97 S. Ct.
at 1802-03.
145. See note 139 supra.
146. Professor Cornelius J. Scanlon of the University of Connecticut School of Law.
147. Professor Scanlon thereby lost the opportunity to test his legal opinion that
mediators could not be forced to testify. Connecticut mediators employed by the State
Board of Mediation and Arbitration were already protected. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-100 (1977).
148. These assertions should be self-evident. See generally on the subject of
mediator confidentiality W. MAGGIOLO, TECHNIQUES OF MEDIATION IN LABon DIS
PUTES 35-37 (1971):
As previously mentioned the policy of the United States is to rely on colIective
bargaining and mediation as the principal means of resolving industrial con
flicts. To effectuate that policy mediators must not only be impartial but must
be considered so by both parties to a labor dispute. In addition, the parties
must be free to talk without risking subsequent disclosure of their confidence.
Such confidence and disclosures are wholly voluntary and cannot be compelled
by a mediator, but without them mediation would cease to be effective in settl
ing labor disputes.
Id. at 35.
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proceeding. 149 However, until 1976, it was not clear whether Con
necticut teacher mediators had the same privilege.
CONCLUSION

The 1976 Amendments to the Connecticut Teacher Negotiation
Act left the basic structure of teacher collective bargaining intact. The
most significant changes were the addition of statutory prohibitions of
unfair labor practices and the granting of jurisdiction over unfair labor
practice disputes to the State Board of Labor Relations. \Vhile the
timetable for bargaining was altered, with bargaining now to com
mence 180 days before a municipality's budget submission date, it
remains to be seen whether this will affect the way negotiators be
have. Including the fiscal authority in the negotiation process appears
frankly to be experimental, and it is too early to determine whether
the change is a success. lSO
Now that the State Board of Labor Relations has jurisdiction over
a part of the teacher negotiation process, the General Assembly may
well consider shifting to the Labor Board the power to conduct
elections. lSI This would allow the Labor Board to make final deci
sions over the bargaining unit during the election. It would eliminate
149. 29 C.F.R. § 1401.2 (1976) provides in part:
No officer, employee, or other person officially connected in all}' C'.Ipacity with
the Service, shall produce or present any confidential records of the Service or
testify on behalf of any party to any cause pending in any arbitr.ltioll or other
proceedings or court or before any board, commission, committee, tribunal, in
vestigatory body, or administrative agency of the United States or of ,lilY State,
Territory, The District of Columbia or any municipality with respect to facts or
other matters coming to his knowledge in his official capacity or with respl.'Ct to
the contents of any confidential records of the Service, whether in answer to an
order, subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, or otherwise, Witllout the prior written
consent of the Director.
Connecticut State Mediators were protected by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-100 (1977).
The Code of Professional Conduct for Labor Mediators, adopted jointly by the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service and the several state agencies represented b)' tile
Association of Labor Mediation Agencies is explicit: "Confidential inform<ltion required
by the mediator should not be disclosed to others for <lny purpose or in a legal proceed
ing...." See W. SIMKIN, supra note 82, at 392.
150. As of mid-August of 1977, 16 municipalities did not ha\'e teacher contracts,
compared to 70 a year ago. See The Hartford Courant, Aug. 22, 1977, at 3D, col. 7.
151. The State Board of Labor Relations currently conducts all elections among non
certified employees of boards of education, under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-471 (1977).
See, e.g., Norwalk Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dl'C. No. 1559 Uul)' 22,
1977) (whether school monitors should be added to unit of custodians, drivers, and
maintenance workers); East Haddam Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec.
No. 1519 (March 3D, 1977) (secretaries, library clerks, teacher aides, and custodians).
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the ever-present possibility that a moderator will allow a person to
vote and the Labor Board will thereafter declare that person outside
of the bargaining unit (or vice versa). Giving the elections over to the
Labor Board would enable it to resolve differences between teacher
organizations and boards of education over election campaign prac
tices and would make possible formal post-election challenges. This
change would not be without costs. The present use of the AAA is
fast and efficient. The decisions of the moderators, right or wrong,
are final. Bargaining is not delayed by post-election challenges. The
choice, as always, is between speed and efficiency on the one hand,
and consistency on the other.
The largest unknown is the impact of Horton v. Meskill. 152 It is
always easier to reach an agreement when there is money in the till.
How much money this decision will bring to some of the hard
pressed school districts is the question that the state will be facing
during the next few years. It may ultimately have a greater impact on
bargaining than the 1976 Amendments. Until the state money begins
to flow, however, negotiators will continue to struggle with the prob
lems of taxes, inflation, town nullification, and teacher strikes. The
1976 Amendments have, on balance, improved the Act, but further
improvements are warranted.
152.

172 Conn. 615,376 A.2d 359 (1977).

